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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes individual-level factors that help explain why some Mex-
icans trust Americans and why many more distrust them. The author develops a
statistical model based on survey data that explains the determinants of Mex-
icans’ trust in the United States government and citizens and compare it to trust in
Canadians, Mexicans living in the United States, and other Latin American na-
tional groups. The aim is to identify structural and attitudinal traits and orienta-
tions among Mexicans to help us understand their views of their North American
neighbors. The results show that Mexicans’ trust in Americans is distinctive and
particular and has a different rationale than that of trust in other countries and na-
tionalities. Sharing some values and ideological orientations fosters trust, whereas
sticking to certain types of nationalist sentiment –not all types– undermines it. A
strong and distinctive predictor of Mexicans’ trust in the United States is social
interconnectedness, a bridge built by immigration.
Key words: Mexican public opinion, trust in the United States, ideology, nationalism, social
interconnectedness
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INTRODUCTION
Public opinion studies generally show that Mexicans are ambivalent toward Amer-
icans. On the one hand, historical experiences and cultural differences have left a
permanent mark on Mexico’s collective consciousness, commonly activating a sense
of rejection and distrust. On the other hand, most Mexicans believe that closer ties
to the United States benefits them, providing evidence that their attitudes and opin-
ions toward Americans are as driven by self-interest as by national pride and his-
torical resentment, if not more. A growing interconnection, enhanced by the creation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and by impressive migraton
patterns during the last decade and a half, has strengthened both commercial and
societal ties between the two countries, and this has made Mexican views of the
United States more favorable. A single indicator of this is increased trust by Mex-
icans of their American neighbors. According to World Values Survey (WVS) data
gathered in Mexico, the proportion of Mexican adults who expressed trust in Amer-
icans increased from 20 percent to 36 percent between 1990 and 2005. This is a sub-
stantial change, yet the level of trust remains comparatively low. In comparison, 55
percent of Canadians interviewed in the 1990 WVS said they trusted Americans, and
by 2005 that proportion had increased to 63 percent.
Despite the significant increase of trust over the last 15 years, Mexicans remain
rather distrustful of the United States. What drives this? Is it an almost immutable
cultural predisposition passed from generation to generation? Is it a set of ideolog-
ical orientations that reject, by default, any American ideas, expressions, and inter-
ests? Or is it an ironclad nationalist sentiment that simply is not open to the idea of
community and of others? I address these and other similar questions in this article.
As way to look for some answers, I developed a survey-based statistical model of
Mexicans’ trust in Americans and other national groups. The results confirm that
ideology and nationalism matter when it comes to trust or distrust but so, too, does
social interconnectedness, and in very favorable ways. 
As a component of public opinion, trust in other nationalities is particularly
relevant to foreign policy. Former Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús
Reyes Heroles noted, for example, that “Perceptions about other countries are im-
portant because they create the space where working together becomes possible”
(Reyes Heroles, 2005: 45). Some studies have demonstrated that “citizens use gen-
eralized beliefs about how much their nation can trust other nations to form judg-
ments about world affairs” (Brewer et al., 2004: 93), setting the foundation for mass
support for international cooperation. Smith and Wertman found, for example, that
most Western Europeans viewed Americans as “trustworthy” in 1990, just as the post-
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Cold-War era began, leading those authors to conclude that “[a]s European policy-
makers begin the process of redefining U.S.-West European relations they are not
constrained by anti-American public sentiment” (Smith and Wertman, 1992: 194).
Public opinion is a factor for international cooperation.
The American-led war on terrorism triggered by 9/11 has modified public
opinion about the United States, not only in Western Europe but in other regions of
the world as well. A poll conducted early in 2007 for the BBC World Service in 25
countries showed a deterioration of the United States’ image in the world: about 29
percent of respondents had a “mainly positive” view of the United States, 11 per-
centage points less than a similar study conducted in 2005; in contrast, “mainly neg-
ative” views increased from 46 percent to 52 percent in the same period. The poll
was done by Globescan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)
from November 2006 to January 2007 and included more than 26,000 interviews,
about 1000 in each country. Trust in, and opinions about, the United States may
correspond directly to changes in American foreign policy. Evidence from West
European surveys carried out from the 1950s to the early 1980s shows that there are,
in fact, important shifts in the level of favorable opinions about the United States,
depending on the period and policy direction (Russett and Deluca, 1983).
If this can be translated to the North American context, changing patterns of
Mexican trust in the United States may limit or expand the opportunities for bilater-
al cooperation in current issues like immigration, drug-trafficking, or NAFTA-related
trade disputes. Moreover, understanding the current sources of trust and distrust in
the region may also assist the political mobilization of support for specific policies.
In this article I analyze individual-level factors that help explain why some
Mexicans trust Americans and why many more distrust them. The statistical model
I developed helps explain Mexican trust and distrust in the United States government
and in American citizens, separately, as well as in Canadian citizens and Mexicans
living in the United States, as a way to cover the North American region as extensive-
ly as possible. My aim is to identify structural and attitudinal traits and orientations
among Mexicans that serve as bases for more general favorable and unfavorable views
toward their North American neighbors. Rather than relying on cultural and histor-
ical explanations, I develop an argument based on public opinion theories and con-
cepts. I borrow from theoretical approaches that view opinions as a combination of
information and predisposition influenced by elite cues (Zaller, 1992) and as a result
of how principles, group references, and self-interest respond to “frames” or “inter-
pretative structures embedded in the political discourse” (Kinder and Sanders,
1996: 164). If I am able to link certain individual predispositions and orientations
of theoretical relevance to trust and distrust, I may have taken one of at least two
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important steps in discovering whether trust responds to political communication.
The other step, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is to describe the patterns
of pro-American and anti-American discourse in Mexican politics and society dur-
ing the last couple of decades. 
The idea that changes in public opinion reflect, among other things, changes in
elite discourse is a generally accepted premise but proposing that social trust changes
as a response to specific processes of mass communication may stand on less solid
ground. Trust is generally seen as a cultural trait (Fukuyama, 1995; Inglehart, 1997;
Putnam, 2000) and, even if not immutable, it is expected to change gradually. Trust
may be closer to being an enduring attitude than a spontaneously formed opinion. 
World Values Survey data show that the already low levels of interpersonal or
social trust in Mexico decreased significantly during the last decade and a half. A
standard measure of social trust included in the WVS questionnaire and in other com-
parative studies (see Uslaner, 2002: Brewer et al., 2004) is the percent of respondents
who say that “most people can be trusted.” The Mexican WVS surveys show that the
proportion of social trust decreased from 33 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2005.
The 1996 and 2000 samples showed proportions of interpersonal trust of 26 percent
and 21 percent, respectively. Interpersonal trust in Mexico dropped by half in only
fifteen years. 
The decline of social trust in Mexico might suggest that Mexicans’ distrust in
Americans is simply a reflection of a growing level distrust in everyone else. Accord-
ing to Brewer et al., “citizens may derive their general beliefs about whether to trust
other nations from even more general forms of social trust” (2004: 96). However, that
does not seem to be the case. The decrease of social trust in Mexico contrasts with an
increase of Mexican trust in Americans, as stated earlier. In addition, the United States
does not have the same weight in Mexicans’ belief systems and cannot be placed
into a general package of trust or distrust in everybody. There are occasional and,
sometimes, absurd manifestations of rejection toward Americans (such as the embar-
rassing booing of the American representative in a Miss Universe pageant held in
Mexico City in May 2007) as well as strong beliefs that Mexico should be closer to
the United States than to any other country. A national poll by the daily newspaper
Reforma of 1,515 adults in May 2007 showed, for example, that 65 percent of respon-
dents said that Mexico should have “much closer” or “somewhat closer” relations
with the United States, while 28 percent said that Mexico should be “much more”
or “somewhat more” distant from it.
Judging from the polling data that Jorge Castañeda, in his collaborative work
with Robert Pastor (1989) quoted, Mexicans today are much more favorable to the
United States than they were two decades ago: according to that poll, 6 out of 10
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Mexicans interviewed in 1986 thought of the United States as “dislikable and both-
ersome,” and “enemies” (Castañeda and Pastor, 1989: 60-61). No anti-Americanism
of that magnitude is observed in national polls today. Half the respondents to a  2006
Comexi-CIDE poll about Mexicans’ views on foreign policy considered that having
the U.S. as neighbors brings more advantages than problems (as opposed to 39 per-
cent who think the opposite), and expressed more favorable opinions about the U.S.
and Canada than about other countries (González and Minushkin, 2006: 17). 
Finding particular characteristics of Mexican public opinion about the United
States different from people’s opinions about Americans in other countries is a great
challenge. The United States generates mixed feelings in a variety of countries,
whether allies or foes, and it seems that anti-Americanism has endured, if not deep-
ened, in the recent age of globalization. In a paper published in 1992, Smith and
Wertman stated that “[t]he United States is the most powerful country in the world
and now its only superpower; American policies, culture, and economy affect every
part of the world. American popular culture, including its films, television pro-
grams, songs, styles, and fads, influence lifestyles throughout the world. Because of
this pervasive, multi-faceted role on the world stage, most foreigners have an interest
in and attitudes about the United States (whether these attitudes are well-informed
or not)” (Smith and Wertman, 1992: 188). The war against terrorism has most like-
ly expanded the scope and meaningfulness of opinions about the U.S. throughout
the world. Pro- and anti-American feelings are a central aspect of today’s world
affairs, not only expressed as support or rejection of American foreign policy (in par-
ticular war policy), but also as “an unfocused and largely irrational, often visceral
aversion toward the United States,” as Paul Hollander (1992) succinctly put it (quot-
ed in Smith and Wertman, 1992: 189).
In previous research, I have explored the ambivalence of Mexicans’ attitudes
toward Americans (Moreno, 2002a), as well as the specific weight of self-interest
(Moreno, 2002b), values (Moreno, 2005), ideology, and a set of contradicting predis-
positions (Moreno, 2006) in Mexican’s opinions about the United States and NAFTA. In
this article I develop a more comprehensive model of Mexicans’ trust and distrust
in the North American “community,” including the U.S. government, American cit-
izens, Mexicans living in the United States, and Canadians. It is a comprehensive
model not just because it focuses on more national groups and the U.S. government,
but because it includes multiple explanatory variables that tap four general areas of
theoretical relevance: structural variables, ideological orientations, nationalist sen-
timents, and exposure to information. Each one of these general areas involves spe-
cific indicators that reflect diverse hypotheses about how Mexicans view their
northern neighbors. I also test the model by analyzing Mexicans’ trust and distrust
68
ALEJANDRO MORENO
NORTEAMÉRICA
in Argentineans, Brazilians, Colombians, and Cubans, as a way to see whether Mex-
icans’ trust in people from North America has it own particularities or whether it is
a reflection of general trust in other nationalities. I do, in fact, find some particular-
ities that will be discussed in the rest of the paper, but before getting to them, I will
briefly describe the data I used for the analysis.
DATA OVERVIEW
The primary evidence for the analysis in this article is a survey conducted in both
Mexico and the United States (including an oversample of Mexican-Americans) in
2003. This study followed the structure of the World Values Survey questionnaire,
and included additional items tapping specific cultural differences between Mex-
icans, Americans, and Mexican-Americans. I used only the Mexican data, derived
from a national representative sample of 2380 face-to-face interviews. In particular,
this survey asked the level of trust that Mexicans have in people of other national-
ities, including those of North America. The survey was sponsored by Banamex
and is fully described in a report about the values and beliefs of Mexicans in both
countries (see Moreno, 2005).
In addition to this survey, I also show trends and indicators of Mexican public
opinion derived from national face-to-face quarterly polls sponsored and conducted
by the newspaper Reforma between 2003 and 2007. Unless otherwise indicated, Re-
forma national polls are based on 1500 interviews with Mexican adults. The Reforma
national quarterly polls offer an almost unique time series of Mexican opinions
about the United States and the U.S. government, some of which are shown here. 
Finally, as already noted, I continuously refer to the World Values Survey in
this article, especially to the four sets of Mexican samples collected between 1990
and 2005. Those samples average slightly over 1500 face-to-face interviews each,
available at the WVS web page (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), in addition to other
printed forms of reference (see Inglehart et al., 1998; Inglehart et al., 2004; and
Halman et al., forthcoming).
MEXICANS’ TRUST IN NORTH AMERICA
As mentioned earlier, World Values Survey data show an increase of Mexicans’
trust in Americans during the last 15 years. Nonetheless, the level of trust remains
comparatively low. The 2003 Banamex survey of values confirms this. About 25
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percent of Mexicans said they trust American citizens “a great deal” or “quite a lot,”
whereas 75 percent said they don’t trust them very much or at all. Proportions in
reference to the U.S. government are quite similar: 23 percent expressed trust, and
77 percent distrust. The level of trust in Canadians is slightly lower: 20 percent of
Mexicans said they trust Canadians, and 80 percent said they do not. Familiarity
with Canada is, of course, lower in Mexico than familiarity with the United States.
These data are displayed in Table 1. 
The survey also shows that most Mexicans trust their compatriots who live in
the United States. About 51 percent of respondents said that they trust Mexicans
living in that country and 49 percent said they do not. This is, by far, the highest
level of trust Mexicans expressed in the survey in reference to specific national
groups. That finding contrasts with the low level of interpersonal trust recorded by
the same survey (16 percent), which leads us to question whether the standard
measure of social trust and the measure of trust in other nationalities actually tap the
same underlying dimension or a different one. For example, the level of trust in Mex-
icans living in the United States cannot be a reflection of Mexican’ general social
trust, which is rather low. One explanation is that, although Mexicans are general-
ly distrustful of people, they posit a great deal of trust in their family members, and
this includes those who live in the United States. National polls conducted by
Reforma during the last few years indicate that slightly over 50 percent of respondents
Table 1
MEXICANS’ TRUST IN NORTH AMERICANS AND LATIN AMERICANS IN 2003
A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all
% % % %
U.S. Government 4 19 34 43
U.S. Citizens 5 20 33 42
Mexicans living in the U.S. 17 34 24 22
Canadians 4 16 32 48
Argentineans 2 13 30 55
Brazilians 2 14 31 53
Colombians 2 12 31 55
Cubans 3 13 31 53
Source: Banamex Survey of Values in Mexico and the U.S., 2003; n = 2 380 in the Mexican sample. 
70
ALEJANDRO MORENO
NORTEAMÉRICA
say that they have a relative living in the United States, and in the 2003 Banamex
survey of values, 47 percent said the same. 
As a way to compare Mexicans’ trust in national groups from North America,
Table 1 also shows Mexicans’ levels of trust in other national groups from Latin Amer-
ica. The first noteworthy fact in these data is that Mexicans tend to distrust other
Latin American nationalities more than they distrust their North American neighbors.
About 85 percent of respondents said they distrust Argentineans, and a similar pro-
portion said the same about Brazilians, Colombians, and Cubans. The level of trust in
those nationalities averages 15 percent, 10 percentage points lower than trust in Amer-
icans recorded in the same survey. Thus, a second noteworthy fact is that the levels
of trust (or distrust) expressed in these national groups from Latin America varies little. 
The survey shows that Mexicans expressed similar levels of trust and distrust
in Americans and in the United States government and this similarity might sug-
gest that Mexicans do not clearly differentiate among them. However, that is not the
case. Mexicans actually make a clear differentiation between Americans and their
government and this can be demonstrated by looking at opinion trends about both.
As shown in Figure 1, Mexicans had relatively stable views about the United States
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MEXICANS’ OPINIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES, 2003-2005
Source: Reforma national face-to-face quarterly polls, n = 1500 each. Percent “no opinion” and “don’t know”
not shown.
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from 2003 to 2005. During that period, an average of 42 percent of Mexicans ex-
pressed a favorable opinion about the United States with a low point of 36 percent
in November 2003, and a high point of 48 percent in February 2005. This figure also
shows that, during those years, favorable opinions about the United States exceeded,
by at least a 2 to 1 ratio, the proportion of unfavorable opinions, and this is not par-
ticular to those specific years. Earlier polls conducted by the The New York Times in
1986 and by Los Angeles Times in 1989, 1991, and 1996 (the latter in collaboration with
Reforma) recorded very similar proportions of favorable and unfavorable opinions
in Mexico about the United States (see Moreno, 2006). We can safely conclude that
Mexicans have had a predominantly favorable opinion about the United States dur-
ing the last two decades and that anti-American sentiment has been a minority
view. Likewise, survey data gathered in the United States in 2003 and reported in
an article by Jesús Reyes Heroles show very similar proportions of favorable and
unfavorable opinions about Mexicans: 45 percent of Americans expressed favorable
opinions about their southern neighbors, whereas 24 percent expressed unfavor-
able opinions. (Reyes Heroles, 2005: 47). 
Things are different if we consider the U.S. government or, more specifically,
the U.S. president, as a reference for Mexican public opinion. Figure 2 shows
Mexicans’ opinions about President George W. Bush from late 2001 to early 2007.
The trend shows that Bush’s image among Mexicans deteriorated significantly dur-
ing that period. After enjoying over 40 percent of favorable opinions in some of the
first few measurements, Bush’s favorability rating in Mexico went down to less
than 20 percent in some of the last polls. Evidence of the deterioration of Bush’s
image started in 2003, when the proportion of unfavorable opinions actually sur-
passed that of favorable ones by 13 percentage points –remember that opinions
about the United States remained stable. At that time, Mexico had voted against the
war in Iraq in the UN Security Council, which means that the Mexican political dis-
course justifying that decision was not favorable to the U.S. president. In November
2003, Mexico’s ambassador to the UN, the late Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, publicly stat-
ed that the U.S. viewed Mexico as a “backyard,” an accusation that had some reso-
nance in the Mexican media. 
In 2006 and 2007, unfavorable opinions about the American president were
about 20 percentage points higher than favorable views. The deterioration of Bush’s
image in those latter years appears to be linked to the border fence issue. In January
2006, President Bush announced his intentions to build a fence along the U.S.–Mex-
ico border to counter illegal immigration. Mexican public opinion reacted harshly
towards the American president for that. The percent of negative opinions about
President Bush in 2006 and 2007 are the highest that an American President has had
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in Mexico since Ronald Reagan in 1986 (see Moreno, 2006). Whatever the domestic
reasons President Bush had to raise the fence issue, he certainly cultivated a grow-
ing opposition south of the border. 
A STATISTICAL MODEL OF MEXICANS’ TRUST IN NORTH AMERICA
In this section I develop a statistical model that includes several individual-level
determinants of why Mexicans trust or distrust other national groups. The model is
based on the Banamex survey of values conducted in 2003. Trust in each one of the
national groups shown in Table 1 is used as a dependent variable. Because the scale
of trust used in those variables is ordinal (“a great deal,” “quite a lot,” “not very
much,” and “not at all”), I employed ordered probit estimates. The inclusion of in-
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not shown.
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dependent variables in the model responds to theoretical expectations based mostly
on why Mexicans trust or distrust the United States. Thus, it is an American-centric
model. Rather than being a serious limitation, this is a way to assess how certain
factors that explain trust in Americans may not matter when it comes to explaining
trust in other national groups.
The independent variables in the model have been grouped in four general
conceptual areas: structural variables, ideological orientations, nationalist senti-
ments, and information variables. Structural variables represent socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics of Mexicans, such as age, education, urban-rural resi-
dence, and region, as well as two measures of interconnection with the United States:
whether the respondent has close relatives living there (47 percent), and whether he
or she receives money from them (14 percent). The model also includes a variable
of household financial satisfaction. Theoretical expectations about variables refer-
ring to having relatives in the U.S. and receiving money from them are straightfor-
ward: a higher degree of interconnection should positively relate to trust. Hypotheses
corresponding to the rest of the structural variables follow a general argument
based on a modernization approach: trust in strangers should be higher among the
more modern segments of society. Thus, more educated, urban Mexicans living in
industrial regions should express higher levels of trust not only in Americans but
also in other national groups. The model originally included the respondents’ gender
but the variable was dropped after showing no statistical significance and lacking
a theoretical expectation with regard to views towards Americans and other na-
tional groups.
Ideological orientations are expected to be strongly linked to views about the
United States. Under this classification, I have included a number of measures that
tap general ideological predispositions, as well as some more specific ones: views
on foreign investment, world trade and globalization, economic individualism, left-
right self-placement, subjective belonging to the middle class, and a measure of re-
gional cultural identity. Let me briefly describe each of these variables and state a
corresponding theoretical expectation justifying their inclusion in the model.
Views on foreign investment, world trade, and economic individualism tap a
relatively similar economic dimension and are measured in a way that favorable
views on trade, investment, and economic freedom are clearly differentiated
from unfavorable views on those issues, which are common American worldviews.
Sharing those views means sharing core beliefs of American political culture, such
as economic individualism, a central component of the so-called “American ethos”
(McClosky and Zaller, 1984). Hence, the hypothesis tied to these variables is that
individuals who share these common American views should express more trust in
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the United States. Likewise, Mexicans who reject these economic views and prefer-
ences should be more likely to distrust the way U.S. foreign investment was measured
using a 10-point scale of how important the respondent considers foreign invest-
ment to be for the country, from “very important” to “not important at all.” A col-
lapsed version of the scale shows that 10 percent placed themselves in categories 1
to 4, 17 percent in categories 5 and 6, and 73 percent in categories 7 to 10. I grouped
these categories for illustration purposes, but the variable was included in the model
using its original scale. 
Views on world trade rely on a question about whether the respondent feels
that globalization is good or bad. This question had a preceding framing that helps
us understand responses in more than just a moral dimension of good versus bad:
I’d like to ask you about world trade and globalization: people who favor world trade
think that it’s good because it fosters economic growth, jobs, more competitive compa-
nies, technological development, and prosperity. People who oppose world trade think
that it brings unfairly balanced economic growth, it creates more dependence of poor
countries on the rich, and it deepens social inequalities, environmental problems, and
loss of national sovereignty. Do you personally think that world trade is good or bad?
Responses to this question were distributed as follows: 78 percent thought it
was good, 14 percent thought it was bad, and the rest had no opinion. So far, the
data show that most Mexicans are favorable to foreign investment and world trade,
and a minority opposes them. 
Economic individualism is a composite index based on two sets of questions
replicated from the World Values Survey questionnaire: “Incomes should be made
more equal” versus “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual
effort” and “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that every-
one is provided for” versus “People should take more responsibility to provide for
themselves.” Both variables used a 10-point scale for responses. The economic-indi-
vidualism resulting variable combines them into a newer 19-point scale (reliability
analysis resulted in a Chronbach’s alfa of 0.53). Those who scored on categories 1
to 9 (income equality and state responsibility) represent 34 percent, whereas those
who scored on categories 11 to 19 (individual incentives and individual responsi-
bility) represent 52 percent. This indicator summarizes a state-versus-market value
dimension. 
A standard 10-point left-right self-placement scale was also added into the
model. Previous works have shown that leftist Mexicans tend to be less pro-Amer-
ican than rightist ones (Moreno, 2006), in accordance with a general theoretical ex-
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pectation about this relationship. The left is usually more critical of the United States
than the right. Nineteen percent of respondents placed themselves in categories 1
to 4 (left), whereas those on the right (categories 7 to 10) add up to 44 percent. The
two center categories concentrated 28 percent of respondents. Along with left-right
identities, I also included a measurement of subjective social class. This is a dichoto-
mous variable that represents respondents who consider themselves middle and
upper-middle class (18 percent). My theoretical expectation is based on the idea that
middle-class Mexicans are the primary consumers of American culture and lifestyles
through the mass media and the ones who adopt more American values at home and
the workplace. However, increasing patterns of migration from both the cities and the
countryside to the United States could challenge this idea, as direct contact with
the U.S. mixes among several socioeconomic segments.
As a final indicator in this set of ideological variables I have included a mea-
surement of regional cultural identity, which refers to the continental region to
which the respondent believes Mexico culturally belongs: North America or Latin
America. About 26 percent said Mexico belongs culturally to North America but 59
percent pointed to Latin America and 6 percent to both. Interestingly, the percent-
age of Mexicans who say that Mexico belongs geographically to North America is
slightly higher (32 percent), whereas about 53 percent place Mexico as a geographic
part of Latin America. This variable reveals how limited the sense of North Amer-
icanism is among Mexican society, despite 13 years of NAFTA. Most Mexicans think
that their country is not geographically or culturally attached to North America.
The theoretical expectation in this case is also straightforward: a stronger sense of
cultural identity with North America should translate into a higher sense of trust in
North American national groups, whereas a stronger Latin American identity should
reduce that possibility. 
Some people may argue that nationalism is another form of ideology (Smith,
2001: 21-42). However, given its relevance to analyzing trust in other nationalities,
I decided to group the variables that tap nationalist sentiments as a separate set.
The variables in this group include national pride, the importance that respondents
give to national sovereignty, a sense of local identification referred to as parochial-
ism, the priority that Mexicans give to their own nationality when jobs are scarce,
and a particular calculation of admiration of Mexican and American companies
that was included in the 2003 Banamex survey of values, which I interpret as a
measure of anti-American consumer sentiment. A general theoretical expectation
applies to this group of variables: stronger nationalist sentiments, especially those
that see national identity as a factor of existential security, translate into distrust in
strangers or in people of other nationalities. 
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Specific measurements of these variables are as follows: national pride was
measured using the WVS question, “How proud are you of being Mexican?” Responses
do not allow for much variance, though: 87 percent said they were “very proud,”
10 said they were “quite proud” and the remaining 3 percent was “not very proud” or
“not at all proud.” The question of how important national sovereignty is for the
respondent used a 10-point scale, in which 43 percent of respondents placed them-
selves on 10 (meaning “very important”). About 12 percent chose categories 1 to 5
(representing less importance) and 46 percent chose categories 6 to 9. This and the
other variables hitherto described were included in the statistical model using the
expanded version of the scale, not the collapsed version I am using for illustration
purposes. Parochialism is a dichotomous variable that groups respondents who said
they have a sense of belonging to the town or city where they live (22 percent), as
opposed to the country, the continent, or the world as a whole. Prioritizing Mexicans
when jobs are scarce also is a WVS question: “Do you agree or disagree with the fol-
lowing statement: ‘When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Mexicans
over foreigners?’” About 82 percent of respondents agreed, 10 percent disagreed,
and the rest had no opinion. 
Finally, an original measurement of admiration for companies included in the
Banamex survey allowed me to construct a variable that taps pro-Mexican and pro-
American positions. After initial factor analyses of opinions that included Mexican
public and private companies such as Pemex (the state-run oil company), Telmex
(Mexico’s major private telephone company), and Aeroméxico (one of the country’s
two major airlines), as well as American global corporations such as Coca Cola,
Wal-Mart, and Ford Motor Company, I decided to construct the company admira-
tion index using only Pemex and Ford Motor Company. Since the original variables
were measured using a 10-point scale (where 10 represents a lot of admiration, and
1 no admiration at all), the resulting variable ranges from -9 (total admiration of
Ford and no admiration for Pemex) to +9 (the other way around). About 44 percent
of respondents scored 0, which means that they equally admired both companies.
Thirteen percent scored below 0 (preferring Ford over Pemex), and 43 percent above
0 (preferring Pemex over Ford). 
The final set of two variables refers to exposure to information. The first is a
composite index of exposure to news media, including television, radio, and news-
papers. Since the original question used a 4-point scale (the respondent followed
news in the specific medium a great deal, somewhat, not very much and not at all),
the composite index ranges from 3 to 12. Thirty-eight percent of respondents scored
10 or higher; categories 7 to 9 concentrated 42 percent of them, and 6 or lower rep-
resented 20 percent. The other variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the
respondent is an Internet user (only 16 percent of Mexican adults). My expectation
for these two variables breaks down into two explanations. The first is a continua-
tion of the modernization theory approach referred earlier: mass-media use is more
common among modern segments of society, which, in turn, are more likely to trust
others. The second has to do with public-opinion theory, in which information plays
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Table 2
MEXICANS’ TRUST IN NORTH AMERICANS: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS 
(ORDERED PROBIT MODEL)
Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in
U.S. Government U.S. Citizens Mexicans living Canadians
in the U.S.
b sig b sig b sig b sig
Structural variables
Age -0.034 0.017 -0.032 -0.035
Education -0.072 -0.017 0.046 0.094 *
Urban 0.010 0.130 * 0.049 0.079
Northern region 0.130 * 0.143 * 0.053 0.032
Relatives in the U.S. 0.204 ** 0.138 * 0.188 ** 0.048
Money from relatives 0.088 0.072 0.096 -0.017
Financial satisfaction 0.012 0.005 -0.002 0.010
Ideological variables
Views on foreign investment 0.025 * 0.020 0.015 0.018
Views on world trade 0.107 0.123 * 0.134 * 0.047
Economic individualism 0.017 ** 0.024 ** 0.015 ** 0.022 **
Left-right self-placement 0.013 0.002 -0.012 -0.004
Subjective middle class 0.134 * 0.119 0.033 0.133
Cultural identity 
(Latin vs. North American) 0.046 0.059 * 0.003 0.079 *
Nationalism variables
National sovereignty 0.016 0.033 * 0.028 * 0.057 **
National pride 0.062 -0.082 -0.072 -0.100
Parroquialism -0.146 * -0.138 * -0.009 -0.056
Scarce jobs for Mexicans -0.040 -0.111 ** -0.030 -0.089 *
Company admiration 
(Ford. vs. Pemex) -0.036 ** -0.043 ** -0.003 -0.048 **
Information variables
Exposure to news media 0.079 ** 0.078 ** 0.044 ** 0.076 **
Internet user 0.165 * 0.227 ** 0.063 0.214 **
Pseudo R –Square 0.097 0.119 0.046 0.121
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Banamex Survey of Values in Mexico and the U.S., 2003; n = 2380 in the Mexican sample.
Author´s calculations. b = coefficient, sig = level of statistical significance: * p < = 0.05; ** p < = 0.01.
a crucial role in forming opinions. Since frequent news media followers and Internet
users are more exposed to information, the weight of specific predispositions, such
as nationalism or anti-American sentiments, may be reduced. 
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Table 3
MEXICANS’ TRUST IN LATIN AMERICANS: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS 
(ORDERED PROBIT MODEL) 
Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in
Argentineans Brazilians Colombians Cubans
Structural variables
Age -0.086 * -0.091 * -0.100 * -0.117 **
Education 0.121 ** 0.141 ** 0.108 * 0.107 *
Urban 0.136 * 0.158 * 0.147 * 0.196 **
Northern region 0.014 0.015 0.064 0.008
Relatives in the U.S. -0.016 -0.005 -0.010 0.012
Money from relatives -0.004 0.023 -0.012 -0.050
Financial satisfaction 0.023 0.017 0.023 0.024
Ideological variables
Views on foreign investment 0.014 0.022 0.004 0.008
Views on world trade 0.022 0.016 0.048 -0.016
Economic individualism 0.027 ** 0.023 ** 0.024 ** 0.020 **
Left-right self-placement -0.005 -0.012 -0.003 -0.001
Subjective middle class 0.078 0.103 0.100 0.054
Cultural identity 
(Latin vs. North American) 0.076 * 0.083 ** 0.079 * 0.071 *
Nationalism variables
National sovereignty 0.055 ** 0.064 ** 0.060 ** 0.061 **
National pride -0.065 -0.119 -0.034 -0.077
Parroquialism -0.083 -0.043 -0.071 -0.075
Scarce jobs for Mexicans -0.138 ** -0.132 ** -0.133 ** -0.127 **
Company admiration 
(Ford vs. Pemex) -0.065 ** -0.061 ** -0.058 ** -0.063 **
Information variables
Exposure to news media 0.065 ** 0.073 ** 0.080 ** 0.082 **
Internet user 0.281 ** 0.307 ** 0.260 ** 0.316 **
Pseudo R –Square 0.144 0.155 0.143 0.154
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Banamex Survey of Values in Mexico and the U.S., 2003; n = 2380 in the Mexican sample. Author´s
calculations. b = coefficient, sig = level of statistical significance: * p < = 0.05; ** p < = 0.01.
RESULTS
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the statistical model just described. Table 2 dis-
plays ordered probit coefficients and their levels of significance corresponding to
Mexicans’ trust in North American groups. Table 3 does the same for trust in Latin
American national groups. 
As shown, ideological variables have a significant impact on Mexicans’ trust in
the United States but some of them have differentiated effects depending upon the
object of trust, whether American citizens or the U.S. government. Economic indi-
vidualism is, as expected, a significant predictor of trust in both. In fact, economic
individualism relates positively and significantly to trust in every group from North
America and from Latin America, which means that this general economic orienta-
tion fosters generalized trust. In contrast, views on foreign investment and on world
trade have more American-oriented effects. Favorable views toward foreign invest-
ment explain trust in the U.S. government, and favorable views on world trade relate
more strongly to trust in American citizens, as well as in Mexicans living in the
United States. Neither one of these two variables relates significantly to trust in
Canadians or any Latin American group included in the analysis, which provides a
first piece of evidence that Mexicans’ trust in the United States and its citizens has
different bases than their trust in other countries and national groups. 
The rest of the ideological variables show the following relationships: coeffi-
cients for left-right self-identification indicate that Mexicans on the right are more
trusting of Americans while those on the left are less trusting of them and more trust-
ing of Mexicans in the U.S., Canadians, and Latin Americans. However, the left-
right self-placement variable does not attain statistical significance in this model.
Generally, the effect of subjective middle class identification in trust is also insignif-
icant except in one case: Mexicans who identify themselves as middle class are more
likely to trust the U.S. government. Finally, regional cultural identity has some in-
fluence on trust as well: Mexicans who identify more with North America are gen-
erally more trusting, regardless of national group, whereas those who identify with
Latin America are less so. Mexicans who consider that their country is culturally
closer to North America, rather than Latin America, are even more likely to trust
Latin Americans. 
Nationalism variables have a mixed influence on trust. The importance of
national sovereignty relates positively and significantly to trust in every national
group, but it has no impact on trust in the U.S. government. Surprisingly, national
pride has no effect on trust, partly because almost 9 out 10 respondents said they
are very proud of being Mexican, allowing very little variance in this indicator.
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Parochialism, a sense of local geographic identification, contributes significantly to
distrust of the U.S. government and American citizens. Finally, admiration of com-
panies proves to be a strong correlate of trust and distrust: the more Mexicans sup-
port an iconic Mexican company (Pemex), and reject an American one (Ford), distrust
in other national groups from both North America and Latin America increases.
The only exception is trust in Mexicans who live in the United States, in which case
company admiration has no effect. This indicator of commercial nationalism con-
tributes significantly to distrust of other nationalities, but it does not statistically
discriminate between Americans and Latin Americans. Commercial nationalism is
simply a element preventing international trust among Mexicans. 
Information variables appear as generally strong predictors of trust. Higher
levels of exposure to media news and the use of Internet contribute significantly to
trust, whereas lack of exposure to them enhances distrust. The only exception
observed in Tables 2 and 3 is the lack of effect of Internet use in trust in Mexicans
who live in the U.S. The rest of the dependent variables are influenced positively
and significantly by both information variables. 
Structural variables have interestingly contrasting effects on Mexicans’ trust in
other national groups. Age is negatively related to trust in Latin Americans (younger
Mexicans are more likely to distrust them), but this variable has no effect on trust
in North American groups, which means that younger and older Mexicans alike
express similar levels of trust or distrust in the United States. Education relates pos-
itively to trust in Latin Americans and Canadians but it does not influence trust in
Americans or their government. Financial satisfaction does not have any effect on
trust, according to these data. Urban dwellers are more likely to trust Latin Amer-
icans, but this variable makes little difference with regard to trust in North America:
urban dwellers trust American citizens more than rural ones do, but the variable
has no impact on trust in the U.S. government.
Mexicans who live in the northern states are also more likely to trust Americans.
This finding is consistent with the reality of the border region. According to Andrew
Selee, “[n]umerous citizens of both countries have everyday contact with each other
through family, neighbors, colleagues, and business associates. This closeness is, of
course, greater in the north of Mexico and the southwest of the United States (and
California and Chicago)” (Selee, 2005: 2). Until now, structural variables explain trust
in Latin Americans relatively well, but they are rather weak predictors of trust in North
America. This is another clear piece of evidence that Mexicans’ trust in Americans res-
ponds to a distinctive reasoning, not to a general trusting or distrusting orientation.
The last piece of evidence that trust in North America is distinctive is shown by
the impact of social interconnection. Having relatives in the United States makes
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Mexicans more trusting of that country, its government, and its citizens, and this is
not dependent on the economic benefit of having such relatives. The variable that
represents respondents who receive money from their relatives in the U.S. has no
statistical significance in trust. Having relatives in the United States increases trust
in American citizens and their government, regardless of direct economic benefit,
but it does not increase trust in Canadians or other Latin Americans. Social inter-
connectedness between Mexico and the United States fosters trust. For those who
argue that Mexican immigration to the U.S. is a dangerous challenge to American
values, these data suggest that it is instead an opportunity of building a trusting
community. As Selee has put it, “We are no longer distant neighbors, but increas-
ingly interdependent neighbors.” Under such conditions, building a community
means building trust; not limits to friendship. The data shown here indicate that
that is the trend Mexicans are starting to follow. 
DISCUSSION
Mexicans’ trust in the United States has increased over the last 15 years, hand in hand
with NAFTA and growing social interconnectedness between the two countries. Yet,
trust remains rather low when compared to the levels of trust that Canadians have in
Americans. In this article, I have shown that Mexicans’ trust in Americans is dis-
tinctive and particular and responds to a different rationale to trust in other coun-
tries and nationalities. Sharing some values and ideological orientations fosters trust,
whereas sticking to certain types of nationalist sentiment –not all types– undermines
it. A strong and distinctive predictor of Mexicans’ trust in the United States is, pre-
cisely, social interconnectedness: Mexicans who have close relatives living in the
U.S. are much more likely to trust American citizens and the American government.
And this condition is not contingent upon the economic benefit –or lack of it– that such
interconnectedness may bring. Family ties seem to be strong enough to increase the
realm of trust in the region in a way that builds bridges between the countries.
After 13 years of NAFTA, most Mexicans do not feel that they are part of North
America either culturally or geographically. Perhaps objective asymmetries be-
tween the countries contribute to that lack of a sense of belonging among Mexicans.
The data shown in this article demonstrates that Mexicans who identify with North
America are generally more trusting, not just of Americans and Canadians but of
other Latin Americans as well. There are also indicators that certain nationalist sen-
timents relate positively to trust while others do not, especially those that find in
nationalism a way to cover some existential insecurity. Mexican politicians are prone
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to place nationalism and national sovereignty as barrier to international cooperation.
It is important to realize that nationalism as a form of identification can be valued
in our coexistence with others and not just be a weapon for our rejection of others. It is
possible to be proud of being Mexican and proud to trade, work, and cooperate with
others. Only then can we have a sense of community. 
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